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Afghanistan signed a ‘return, readmission, and reintegration’ agreement with 
the European Union in 2016, the Joint Way Forward, and legally entered the 
assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) schemes. However, the 
refugees only reaped the aftermath of this decision, many reporting to have 
received little to none of the assistance they were promised before return. 
Their narrative of the voluntariness of their return also seems to be very 
colourful and is an interesting area to investigate what they perceive as 
voluntary and how they define these programmes. Drawing upon 25 interviews 
with Afghans who were returned during 2015-2018 from multiple European 
states, this research analyses these return ‘decisions’ and its voluntariness and 
the assistance provided for returns that have taken place under AVRR 
programmes in the Afghan context. This research will attempt to understand 
and analyse this missing narrative of returnees within the global migration 
governance and politics, including an investigation into the role of the IOM, 
the EU and few other European States, and the Afghan government.  
Keywords 
Return, forced return, deportation, assisted voluntary return and reintegration 
(AVRR), Joint Way Forward (JWF), migration, IOM, Afghanistan, Europe, 
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‘Assisted’ and ‘Voluntary’ Return?  
Implementation of AVRR schemes in Afghanistan 
1 Introduction 
1.1 An overview 
To control migration, states have employed different strategies and one that is 
notable is the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration schemes gaining 
more and more momentum and prominence since the twentieth century as a 
preferable option over deportations (Gibney, 2013; Koch, 2013). Except the 
post-Bonn period (2002-2006), Afghanistan has witnessed large numbers of 
continued out-migration due to the poor security situation and multiple 
political armed conflicts in the country. However, the period after the 2015 
refugee ‘crisis’1  which overwhelmed many of the European states marked as a 
prominent phase of large-scale returns from Europe to Afghanistan. 
Thousands of Afghans were returned from different European countries 
through the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) Schemes 
implemented mainly by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). 
One notable step was by the European Union (EU) which kickstarted these 
returns with the Joint Way Forward (JWF), a ‘return, readmission and 
reintegration’ agreement countersigned by the Afghan government in 2016 
(European Commission, 2016). Even though the JWF includes returns from 
EU member states, analysis of interviews from other European states such as 
Norway has also been included to provide a comparatively wholistic picture of 
the AVRR programmes. 
This research will explore the nature of the assisted voluntary returns to 
Afghanistan by thoroughly examining the narratives of 25 Afghan deportees 
who were returned during the period of 2015 to 2018. Specifically, 
voluntariness and provision of assistance for return and existence of any 
reintegration programs after return will be studied, particularly from the 
returnees’ perspective. An analysis of the IOM’s role as a key international 
organization (recently a UN agency) will be included. 
1.2 Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration, the EU 
and the IOM 
An analysis of the IOM’s role as the main administrator of assisted voluntary 
returns and its contribution to ‘Europeanisation’ of migration policies and 
implementation (Geiger and Pécoud, 2013; International Organization for 
Migration, 2018; Lavenex, 2016; Weinar, Bonjour and Zhyznomirska, 2019) 
constitutes a key part of this study. The Organization’s origins and role in the 
 
 
1 Wilfully being relabelled as the ‘migrant crisis’ even though about 80 percent of 
those who arrived in Europe were from war-torn countries. 
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governance of migration, particularly in relations with different European 
States, its political legitimacy and autonomy, and dependency on project-based 
funding by the EU and other European States and similar donors provide a 
valuable analytical tool. As a tool for assisting “stranded migrants in host or 
transit countries,” regular/irregular migrants, asylum seekers not wanting to 
continue application, and those found ‘ineligible’ for international protection,” 
IOM shortly defines AVR/R programmes as:  
[T]he administrative, logistical and financial support, including reintegration 
assistance, provided to migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the 
host/transit country, who volunteer to return to their countries of origin  
(IOM, 2017). 
It is generally failed asylum seekers, or refugees who have lost status, and 
exhausted all legal avenues for appeal and regularisation through other means, 
in other words, those without rights-to-residency, who are returned under 
AVRR and other AVR schemes run by IOM. The period between rejection 
and the requirement to return is usually around 28 days, after which forced 
removals can be initiated to insist that ‘unwanted’ migrants return ‘home’ 
through an AVR programme. Assistance provided for returnees include ‘pre-
departure’, ‘travel’ and ‘post-arrival and reintegration’ assistance. Generally, it 
includes the flight home (one-way ticket) and a monetary package that is 
supposed to cover the immediate needs of the returnee. In the case of AVRR 
returnees, a reintegration package is offered to help returnees ‘re-establish’ 
themselves at ‘home’.  
The lack of reference to human rights has also been noted in the stance of 
the Organization compared to UNHCR whose legitimacy and political 
autonomy is largely based on its role as the guardian of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (Lavenex, 2016; Pécoud, 2020: 13). These criticisms against the 
Organization have persisted despite its notable shift in the global migration 
governance as a ‘UN-related’ organization since 2016. A contradictory account 
can therefore be noted in IOM’s legal basis for AVRR framework noting both 
“Protection of the rights of migrants during the return and reintegration 
process” and “state sovereignty” (IOM, 2018: 4). As Blitz et al. found in their 
research about voluntary repatriations from the UK to Afghanistan, “domestic 
interest-based arguments, rather than those founded on the protection of 
human rights, are driving the policy-making agenda” (2005: 182) related to 
AVRRs. It is argued that Member States had intentionally kept IOM as a 
‘related’ UN agency only to safeguard its ‘autonomy and independence’ from 
the UN system and to keep its operations adaptable and less bureaucratic 
(Geiger, 2020: 293). 
1.3 The research problem 
Following a contextual perspective, Afghans make up one of the most 
vulnerable groups that need humanitarian assistance both inside and outside 
the country and yet more and more have been returned to the worsening 
security situation (‘Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex 
World’, 2019; Maley, 2020). Recently, thousands of Afghans have been 
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returned to Afghanistan through the AVRR programs implemented mainly by 
the IOM. 2 Afghans who have fled the country is a marginal population that 
does not fit into any of the legal labels regarding refugees and migrants. They 
are caught between institutional, bureaucratic and political games taken up for 
managing migration and covertly avoiding the legal protection responsibilities 
(Zetter, 2007). As ‘rejected asylum seekers,’ Afghans are denied refugee rights 
as Afghanistan is considered safe nor would they consider themselves an 
economic migrant since a main factor these individuals flee is insecurity and 
ongoing conflict in the country. By adding to the information available about 
Afghan refugees and particularly return migration as a practice that has 
potentially led to many human rights violations, this research also has 
humanitarian and rights-based value. 
There are multiple factors that could be considered reasons of return, 
including threat of deportation and hostility, lengthy asylum application 
processes, and reinforcement through assistance offered upon return (Blitz, 
Marzano and Sales, 2005; Koch, 2013; van Houte, 2016; Leerkes, van Os and 
Boersema, 2017). However, the extent that these returns are voluntary or 
assisted is to be questioned for multiple reasons. In Afghanistan’s case, returns 
usually lead to secondary internal displacement, are accompanied with a lack of 
essential services and income-earning opportunities and a higher vulnerability 
against conflict and natural disasters, and can potentially lead to further 
insecurity, recruitment into radical extremist groups, and a threat to the 
legitimacy of an already fragile state (AHRDO, 2019; Majidi, 2017). This 
danger increases with returns being involuntary as preparedness is lowered, 
social networks are disrupted, returnees are stigmatized and isolated, and 
educational and financial opportunities remain low, leaving a national level 
strain on services and a conflict with other residents. These impacts were 
strengthened further by the negative narrative of the representatives of the 
Afghan government about Afghan asylum seekers on media platforms and 
during their visits to European countries (AHRDO, 2019). Besides, a total of 2 
million conflict-induced internal displacements were recorded in 33 of the 34 
provinces during 2015 to 2018 alone which rules out internal flight alternative 
(IFA) opportunities to a large extent (OCHA, 2018).  
1.4 Research objective and questions 
The purpose of this research is to view assisted voluntary returns through both 
a macro global migration governance and politics perspective and a micro re-
turnees’ perspective of their ‘voluntary’ and ‘assisted’ returns. Building up on 
the latter, the findings will largely be based on the returnees’ experiences and 
what they make of return as a migration management strategy which therefore 
facilitates an analysis with a ‘specific contextual focus’ (Creswell, 2013). Besides 
this, how ‘voluntariness’ of returns affect its sustainability and reintegration 
possibilities and the role of different actors including the European Union, 
 
 
2 Asylum seekers, rejected asylum seekers, deportees. 
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IOM and the government of Afghanistan (GoA) will be analysed. Therefore, 
the main research question and sub-question(s) that this study aims to answer 
is: 
• Under what circumstance are Afghan asylum seekers returned 
through assisted voluntary return (AVR) and assisted voluntary re-
turn and reintegration (AVRR) schemes? 
o How voluntary are these returns?  
o In what ways are they assisted in their return and reintegration? 
o What role does the AVRR/JWF play in the return decision (if 
any)? 
o What role do the different actors play in these processes, including 
the European Union, the IOM and the Afghan State?  
1.4 Methodology 
As part of a larger study conducted by the Afghanistan Human Rights and 
Democracy Organization (2019), this research employs a mixed methods ap-
proach using both quantitative and qualitative data collected through semi-
structured interviews. Overall, both primary and secondary data is used during 
analysis. The primary data draws from 25 semi-structured and face-to-face in-
terviews conducted during 2019 with those who were voluntarily or involuntar-
ily returned to Afghanistan from European countries between 2015 and 2018. 
There 25 (out of 50) were selected for this paper based on the year of return, 
the country from where the individuals were returned and applicability for 
analysis of the AVRR and JWF policies. Secondary data includes scholarly arti-
cles, research reports and datasets obtained from different humanitarian and 
development agencies.  
Sampling 
Snowball sampling has been used to find deportees based on connections and 
within their own community. Due to the lack of documentation of returnees 
and sensitivity around the topic, negative social stigma—sense of failure 
attached to return, a snowball sampling strategy seemed the most feasible. 
Returnees/deportees seldom share this information and thus it is hard to find 
individuals of such background. The data has been collected in four central 
regions of the country, Balkh, Herat, Kabul and Nangarhar which can 
potentially be considered as clusters. These regions were chosen since they are 
the four centres receiving the majority of the returns. Besides they could be 
representative of the ethnic, cultural and demographic diversity of Afghanistan 
and thus ensuring proportional representation of the research.  
Data collection instrument 
A semi-structured questionnaire was used for data collection. The mix of both 
open ended and close ended questions fit well with the objectives of the 
research. Close ended questions helped gather important background 
information about the respondents, their migration journeys (such as dates and  
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reasons) and other specific data. Open ended questions on the other hand 
facilitated an open discussion to collect comprehensive data on the 
respondents’ experiences and narratives. Overall, the questions asked are to 
provide us with general information about the returnee, their migration 
journeys, their account of the asylum process and its fairness, their return 
journey, the assistance they received from different actors, their condition after 
the return and other relevant information. The questionnaire employed is 
included at the end of this paper as Appendix I. 
Data analysis 
The data collected was recorded with the consent of the research respondent, 
transcribed, personal and general information coded in separate files for 
confidentiality purposes, personal details deleted if had been requested by the 
research respondent in the consent form, and then analysed.3 After cleaning a 
total of 50 interviews for returns during years 2015-2018 and European 
countries, 25 interviews were chosen for analysis. A thematic analysis was 
conducted on the selected interviews. The data was examined closely, coded 
around specific themes and topics, and then analysed within a theoretical 
context. Direct quotations from the interviews are used throughout the paper 
for better depiction of the narratives.   
Research limitations 
The majority of the research participants are male; only one was female. One 
reason for this discrepancy is that, first of all, the rate of flight for Afghan 
women is very low compared with that for Afghan men (Brun, 2017). A 
second reason is that, comparatively speaking, women are returned less often 
than men proportionally (ibid.). A third reason is that it can prove difficult to 
access female returnees, even when they are returned. For all interview 
material, names have been changed to protect anonymity. However, 
considering the purpose of this research, the gender of the returnee should not 
significantly affect the reliability of the data.  
1.5 Chapter outline 
This research paper will consist of seven chapters overall. Following this 
Chapter (Introduction) which also explains the methodology employed for this 
research such as the data collection method, sampling, and research 
instrument, Chapter 2 (Background) will provide information about 
displacement in the Afghan context with a focus on return migration and the 
AVRR. In Chapter 3 (Literature Review), I have reviewed available literature 
around the topic including literature on the main actors involved such as the 
 
 
3 Since interviews were conducted in Dari, the transcriptions are only in Dari and have 
not been translated to English. The selected excerpts were translated by the author for 
quoting in this paper. 
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European Union, IOM as a lead organization in governance of migration and 
AVR and AVRR schemes, and the Afghan government. Chapter 4 on the 
findings elaborates on ‘voluntariness’ and ‘assistance’ provided during returns 
to Afghanistan using narratives of those returned. Chapter 5 expands with a 
detailed discussion on the JWF, the role of EU and other European States, and 
the Afghan government. Finally, Chapter 6 (Conclusion), besides including a 
brief of the findings, provides further information about what the findings 
mean within the Afghan context and on an international level, particularly 
concerning organizations such as the IOM and other global actors in the 
migration governance nexus.  
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 2 Displacement in Afghanistan (background information) 
2.1 Introduction  
Displacement in Afghanistan makes up one of the most protracted and large-
scale displacement situations in history with major waves traced back to the 
late 1970s war between the Soviet-backed Afghan government and the 
Mujahideen fighters. Multiple factors have played a role in displacing millions 
of Afghans currently making up the second largest group of refugees 
worldwide (UNHCR, 2018). A quarter of the Afghan population has been 
displaced externally and at least three quarters have experienced internal 
displacement at least at one point in their lives (Khan, 2017: 43; UNHCR, 
2018).  
2.2 The mass displacement of Afghans  
Afghanistan comprises a dynamic migration context where multiple factors 
intertangle to create a protracted displacement setting feeding further into 
insecurity, humanitarian emergency situations and socio-economic and political 
chaos. The four decades of war and insecurity have led millions into internal 
and international displacements turning the situation into a humanitarian crisis. 
The displacement situation is worsened by acute poverty, widespread 
unemployment and lack of access to livelihoods and basic services. In 2018, 3.3 
million people experienced acute humanitarian need and 8.7 million were in 
chronic need (OCHA, 2017). In 2020, this rose to one third of the population 
facing food insecurity and about 4 million in an emergency situation in 2020 
(UNOCHA, 2020).  
This complex background of continuous displacement of such a large part 
of the population in an extremely complicated context calls for more research 
to provide evidence for effective and rights-based policy making and practice 
in the field. Figure 1 provides a holistic overview of the prolonged 
displacement situation, providing data about refugee, IDPs and returnee 
numbers over the four decades up until 2018. Displacement in the Afghan 
context has been studied from different perspectives (main researches listed 
under Appendix III); however, there is very little research on return decisions 
under AVRR programmes and readmission policies such as JWF, return 
programs and returns from a global governance and politics perspective 
involving IOs and other actors, and especially research based on narratives of 
those returned.   
As Figure 1 also shows, even though many parts of the country enjoyed a 
peaceful phase during 2002-2006, security started deteriorating again in 2007. 
Destabilization intensified in 2009, steadily escalating to a new level by 2015 
and this situation of insecurity persisted in much of Afghanistan (OCHA, 
2017). Displacement, particularly internally, rose and then levelled off from 
2012 to 2018. From 2005 onwards, the number of asylum applications 
increased significantly (Koser and Kuschminder, 2015: 33) as a result of the 
worsening security situation in the country. An interactive map created by  
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Roggio and Gutowski shows only 33 percent of Afghanistan is currently 
controlled by the Afghan government. The rest is either contested or under 
control of the Taliban and other insurgent groups (n.d.).4 The total number of 
Afghan refugees has remained relatively stable, as shown in Figure 1, but 
overall returns rose during the period. On top of new displacements within an 
already fragile context, Afghanistan now hosts millions of refugees and IDP 
returnees. 
Figure 1 
Overview of Afghan displacement numbers (in millions) 
 
 
2.3 Return migration to Afghanistan 
Afghanistan now hosts thousands of returnees from Iran and Pakistan as well 
as from member states of the European Union and other countries. From 
2010 to 2019, Afghan refugee returnees constituted nearly a quarter of all 
returnees worldwide (875,800: 23 percent); former refugees from the last two 
decades constitute one fifth of the total Afghan population (UNHCR 2019: 
50). Beyond these general figures, detailed data on returns to Afghanistan has 
remained relatively scarce due to poor institutional capacity and for political 
reasons including legal consequences against forced returns.5 Data on forced 




5 https://migrationdataportal.org/themes/return-migration#recent-trends  
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and UK are not fully recorded in Eurostat, the main data source. Unassisted 
voluntary returns are rarely recorded (ibid.). Overall, about 5.3 million Afghan 
refugees voluntarily repatriated from March 2002 to July 2020, of whom 2.7 
million returned after 2015 (IOM-UNHCR 2019; UNHCR 2020) most of 
these returns from Pakistan and Iran.6,7 At the end of 2019, of 2.7 million 
Afghans forcibly displaced internationally, only 0.3 million had applied for 
asylum (UNHCR 2019), most of these in Europe.  
Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) to 
Afghanistan                   
Thousands of Afghan refugees and rejected asylum seekers have been returned 
to Afghanistan, at times voluntarily but also forcibly for those not willing to 
return (IOM, 2018b). As the number of asylum applications increased during 
2015, Europe reemphasized on returns mainly through AVRR. Eurostat data 
confirms that during 2015-2018, a total of 25,290 Afghans were returned to 
Afghanistan from 28 EU member states, increasing to 26,980 individuals once 
Norway is added to this total (Eurostat, 2020). Between 2015 and 2016, returns 
from Europe to Afghanistan tripled, from 3290 to 9460 (Amnesty 
International, 2017: 31) especially compared to the number of asylum 
applications. According to its own data, IOM has “supported” a total of 17,833 
assisted voluntary returns to Afghanistan between 2013 and 2018, with the 
yearly breakdown shown in Figure 2.   
Figure 2 
Yearly Breakdown of IOM-assisted Returns 
  








Figure 2 shows a sharp hike in AVR returns in 2015-2016. A parallel 
decline can be noted in the percentage of asylum applications accepted, falling 
from an average of 68 percent in September 2015 to just 33 percent by 
December of 2016 (Amnesty International, 2019). This decline is not 
surprising given that the migration journey to Europe is now associated with a 
greater risk. It has become easier to be rejected and returned after all effort, 
time and money put in order to arrive to Europe and apply for asylum. During 
2018, it cost an average of 11,120 USD per person for the journey which is 17 
times the per capita income during the year) (AHRDO, 2019: 16). Besides, 
Afghan asylum seekers face different deadly hazards such as kidnapping, 
torture for ransom, beatings and detention by police and armed groups on 
their way to Europe (ibid.: 10).  
The Joint Way Forward 
In 2016, following a conference in Brussels, the GoA and EU signed the Joint 
Way Forward declaration to facilitate “smooth, dignified and orderly return” of 
irregular Afghan migrants who could not fulfil conditions for international 
protection. The JWF was also supposed to facilitate the returnees’ reintegration 
into Afghan society and economy. An example of a “High Level Dialogue on 
Migration,” the JWF cooperation agreement states provides for certain actions 
the EU and the Afghan government are supposed to undertake. The 
commitment of both the EU and the Afghan government towards 
international treaties, notably the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 New 
York Protocol, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights, is reemphasized repeatedly in the declaration. On the other hand, the 
GoA and its relevant ‘competent’ authorities commit to ‘make every effort’ to 
verify evidence of nationality of citizens subject to return, and to provide 
necessary travel documents, including passports, within a period of four weeks, 
as well as to issue visas for EU escort staff ‘without delay’. The GoA was also 
to establish a new terminal for returns at Kabul airport.  
The cooperation agreement and its implementation has been criticized for 
being too focused on the immediate ‘crisis’ of 2015-2016 within Europe, and 
thus not respecting fundamental rights of a relatively small number of Afghans 
in search of protection in Europe during this period, a much smaller number 
than those in neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan (ECRE, 2017; Jones, 
2020). Evidence suggests the government of Afghanistan was pressured into 
signing this deal, and that Afghanistan remains too dangerous a place to return 
thousands of vulnerable individuals who have been labelled ‘irregular migrants’ 
(Bjelica, 2016; “Joint Statement: Afghanistan is Not Safe: the Joint Way 
Forward Means Two Steps Back”, 2020). In some cases, returns under the 
agreement have led to multiple human rights violations, including breaches of 
international legal principle of non-refoulement and threats to the right to life 
(Shea, 2017).  
Both the GoA and the EU denied that the JWF agreement was a 
precondition for aid, amounting to roughly 5 billion Euros. However, a leaked 
document from the European Commission, which is widely available through 
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credible sources online, suggests otherwise (Joint Commission-EEAS non-
paper on enhancing cooperation on migration, mobility and readmission with 
Afghanistan, 2016). The document states that aid was a ‘positive incentive’ for 
implementation of the JWF, as evidenced in this excerpt from the leaked 
document:  
The EU should stress that to reach the objective of the Brussels Conference to 
raise financial commitments “at or near current levels”, it is critical that 
substantial progress has been made in the negotiations with the Afghan 
Government on migration by early summer, giving the Member States and other 
donors the confidence that Afghanistan is a reliable partner able to deliver”  
(EC and EEAS 2016: 8).  
This is hinted at multiple times within the agreement, where reintegration 
package that include development activities are framed as ‘positive incentives’ 
for the GoA. A confidential Afghan government source is quoted as saying 
that Afghanistan was forced to drink the ‘poisoned cup’ of the JWF so it could 
receive much-needed development aid promised in return (Amnesty 
International 2016).  
With returns as the main priority of the agreement (ECRE, 2017), 
involuntary returns rather than actors’ commitment towards ‘safety, dignity and 
human rights’ are at the heart of the JWF. Despite it being part of AVRR 
programmes, the ‘voluntariness’ and ‘choice’ of returnees in the return process 
can be questioned. The excerpt below from the declaration stipulates that if the 
subject has no legal right to remain in Europe and does not ‘choose’ to return 
voluntarily, the individual is to be removed by force:  
Afghan nationals…found to have no legal basis to remain in an EU Member 
State, whose protection needs or compelling humanitarian reasons…have been 
considered in accordance with the applicable legislation and who have received 
an enforceable decision to leave that Member State, can choose to return 
voluntarily. Afghan nationals who choose not to comply with such a decision on 
a voluntary basis will be returned to Afghanistan, once administrative and judicial 
procedures with suspensive effects have been exhausted (European External 
Action Services 2016, emphasis added).  
In conclusion, the meaning of the terms ‘voluntary’ and the subject’s 
‘choice’ remains unclear throughout the cooperation agreement and the 
process of its implementation. Adding to this the millions of internally 
displacement people (IDPs) in Afghanistan and the secondary displacement of 
IDPs and returnees, as we have seen in this chapter, it is difficult to see how 
returnees from European countries, even if ‘voluntary’, can be reintegrated into 
a context where the possibility of an individual’s dignity and safety can only be 
predicted by a miracle or by chance. The notion of sustainable return and 
reintegration seems almost impossible. In short, the majority of Afghans take 
refuge due to insecurity and are almost certainly in serious danger when 
returned, even when they return voluntarily. This hunch will be followed up 
through the findings of this research paper, through deeper analysis of 
respondents’ interview narratives about return.  
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3 Theorizing return migration 
3.1 Introduction  
Return migration has been discussed by scholars from different standpoints 
and within multiple disciplines, including a development or human capital 
perspective. Return, particularly if forced, has been justified as a way to reverse 
the ‘brain drain’ from countries of origin, where returnees can be considered 
‘agents of change’ (Blitz, Marzano and Sales, 2005; van Houte, 2016; Afzali, 
2019). Return to the ‘home’ country can also be considered the end of the 
refugee cycle (Hammond, 1999; Blitz, Marzano and Sales, 2005; de Haas, 
Fokkema and Fihri, 2015). However, just as many scholars have contested the 
very notion of return as the last phase or step towards resolving refugee flight 
and restoring normalcy at the end of displacement (Cassarino, 2004). Return, if 
forced or coerced, has also been studied from a state-centric view, where it is 
increasingly considered the state’s sovereign right to conduct border controls 
and returns of irregular migrants, a legitimate state tool to tackle problems of 
irregular cross-border movements (Blitz, Marzano and Sales, 2005; Koch, 
2013). Alternatively, from a human rights-based approach returning migrants 
to situations of danger is considered a violation of fundamental human rights, 
especially for those who have applied for asylum, in violation of the 
international principle of non-refoulement for those whose asylum cases may not 
have been fully or properly considered due to the state-sanctioned priority of 
deporting them as soon as possible (Webber, 2011; Smith, 2019). A detailed 
discussion of general theories and its (in)ability to provide the theoretical basis 
for this research has been included in Appendix II. Besides these general 
theories about return migration, there are a few other conceptual frameworks 
discussed by other scholars that directly relate to the topic of this research and 
could usefully inform discussions around the ‘voluntariness’ and ‘assisted’ 
nature of AVRRs, sustainability of return and reintegration and the role of 
IOM, the GoA, the EU and other actors in these programs.  
Within this chapter the conceptual debate around return migration is 
narrowed to theorize return within the context of policy making and IOM as a 
noteworthy IO involved in the ‘international’ governance of migration regime. 
Cassarino’s discussion of returnee’s preparedness and resource mobilization is 
of paramount importance in defining voluntariness and reintegration upon 
return (2004). Building on this discussion, the works of Hammond (1999) and 
Koser and Kuschminder (2015) will also be used to create a composite 
theoretical framework that can describe the individual as well as the structural 
reasons for return and assess the voluntariness, readiness, and role of 
returnees’ agency and mobility in their return and post-return contributions to 
the home society.  
3.2 Voluntariness 
Generally, the boundaries between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary/forced’ returns 
have often been blurred (Gibney, 2013). For Webber and other scholars like 
her, the blurring of the categories of refugees, undocumented and irregular 
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migrants and failed asylum seekers, is simply a strategy that is used to justify 
increasing the number of forced removals of ‘unwanted’ people (Webber 
2011). Similarly, Leerkes et al. (2017) have studied policy and non-policy 
factors behind the rapid increase in AVRs from the Netherlands. They confirm 
that returns under these schemes have largely been involuntary and suggest 
that it is important in this regard to at least straighten out the use of 
terminology, since AVRs have, in their view, been a way to legitimize 
deportation, by replacing talk of ‘hard’ powers of states with the linguistic 
device of obliging unwanted migrants to ‘choose’ whether to stay or leave. 
Concluding that AVR returns being hardly voluntary, Kuschminder suggests 
that it is time to change the terminologies around it and drop the ‘voluntary’ 
from the term (2017: 14).  Leerkes et al suggest that AVRR programs should 
be called ‘soft’ deportation, rather than voluntary returns, because they share 
many characteristics with forced deportations. The differences they list are less 
reliance on physical ‘force and deterrence’ than in the case of deportations, but 
other kinds of obligation of departure are premised on the ‘perceived 
legitimacy and…on payments (when assisted)’ as incitements to return under 
bleak prospects for remaining in Europe (Leerkes et al., 2017: 8).  
Returnee’s preparedness upon return 
A key discussion across all these major theories about return migration is the 
relationship between resource mobilization and returnees’ preparedness, and 
the success of return in terms of the propensity for returnees to be able to 
meaningfully contribute to change and development (and therefore reintegrate 
properly) in their ‘home’ countries. Resource mobilization in this case refers to 
both tangible and intangible resources the returnee may be able to mobilize 
during their stay abroad. Preparedness refers both to willingness and readiness 
to return. This leads to the proposition that involuntary returns are 
accompanied with very low level of preparedness which affects the likelihood 
that returnees can meaningfully reintegrate in their ‘home’ country. As 
Cassarino describes it, “to be successfully achieved, return preparation requires 
time, resources and willingness on the part of the migrant” (Cassarino, 2004: 
271). The point about return preparation and willingness in particular can be 
used to explain ‘voluntariness’ of the returns. Building on this further: 
Returnee’s preparedness refers to a voluntary  act  that  must  be  supported  by  
the  gathering of  sufficient  resources and  information  about  post-return  
conditions  at  home…[and that]… to  strengthen  the  link  between  return  
migration  and development at home, return should not simply be viewed as a 
voluntary act on the part  of  the  migrant  but,  above  all,  as  a  proof  of  
readiness (Cassarino, 2004: 271).  
The interviews with returned Afghan asylum seekers propose that AVRR 
returnees lacked both resource mobilization and preparedness to return. Based 
on the characteristics Cassarino describes as preparedness and resource 
mobilization, rejected asylum seekers who are ‘assisted’ to return to 
Afghanistan, either ‘voluntarily’ or forced, do not fit very well into the category 
of return migrants, since their return, as argued later, arises from the state 
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interests at the centre not that of refugees or rejected asylum seekers. That this 
is so, is corroborated by the frequently forced nature of returns and the 
coercion that can be detected even behind returns defined as ‘voluntary’. There 
is little readiness on the side of the returnees to return; there are few resources 
put into the process, or at least into the hands of the returnees. Thus, a lack of 
resource mobilization and the absence of willingness and preparedness tend to 
undermine the hope that returnees will become ‘agents of change’ in their 
home communities after return. 
 In her book on return migration to Afghanistan, van Houte (2016) 
provides a very detailed discussion of return as ‘moving back or moving 
forward’ and has discussed returnees as ‘agents of change’ within the broader 
development nexus. Centred around returnees who fled before 1994 (following 
the fall of the Communist party), fled from 1995 to 2001 (due to civil war, 
Mujahideen and Taliban), and fled after 2001 phase (due to US and allied war), 
the book studies cases of return between 2002 and 2012. One useful finding 
was that returnees’ agency in decision-making and the voluntariness of their 
return were positively related to how well their life situation turned out after 
return, and positively influenced the type of employment and income they 
could access (van Houte 2016: 103). Most genuinely voluntary returnees had 
had opportunities to gain educational and professional qualifications, and 
access other services in the country of asylum. They had returned voluntarily 
knowing they could return later, because of these skills.  Many were involved in 
highly skilled jobs compared to those who were returned involuntarily, and 
whose education, and agency in return, and prospects for social mobility were 
more limited. This in turn was also reinforced by the limited protection status 
many of them were granted in country of asylum, which meant they were 
barred from further study or from working and advancing professionally (van 
Houte 2016: 103). Therefore, van Houte’s study concludes that compared to 
voluntary returns, involuntary returns are a step back and that prospects are 
worsened by restrictions placed on asylum seekers by countries of asylum (van 
Houte 2016: 104).  
Informed decision making and genuineness of choice 
Related to the voluntary nature of returns, especially under AVR programmes, 
Webber (2011) provides an extensive discussion of how ‘voluntary return’ 
programmes for rejected asylum seekers, illegal migrants and others are 
facilitated by EU governments in their own interests only, without seriously 
considering the preparedness or even the safety of those returned. Webber 
argues that even assisting individuals does not ensure reintegration in ‘home’ 
communities since IOM provides only short-term support and does not 
monitor the progress of ‘voluntary’ returnees’ reintegration after return. 
Webber criticizes IOM’s lack of interest, or inability in ensuring justice and 
safety for returnees once they are back in the country of origin. Given the 
political instability and lack of security in many countries from which asylum 
seekers come, most often returnees, especially when they are members of 
minority groups, face hostility from the local authorities and from other 
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people in the country of origin. In most countries, seeking asylum abroad is 
considered as disloyalty or subversion (Webber, 2011: 102). This study will 
reveal similar findings to Webber’s about negative attitudes towards Afghans 
who have been asylum seekers or refugees, and who are often mistreated when 
returned forcibly, at airports and in other arenas. Webber also points out that 
AVR programs, as not entirely voluntary, violate UNHCR guidelines for 
international protection which stipulate that returns can only be voluntary in 
light of the situation in both the country of origin (for an informed choice) and 
the country of asylum (for allowing free choice) (Webber, 2011: 103). The 
information provided to refugees about conditions that could affect them 
upon return can be shown to be ‘partial’ and even ‘suspect’, to the extent that 
taking away their legal right to stay in a European country leaves no room for 
freedom of choice with respect to returning.  
In real terms and as Webber hints to it, it is only through obtaining a 
secure legal status that those who have fled to seek asylum be assured a free 
choice of whether or not to return to their country of origin (2011). Permanent 
resident status and citizenship alone can provide that individual a genuine 
enough choice for it to be considered ‘voluntary’. This is important because 
‘voluntariness’ loses meaning if you cannot return to the host country in case 
things go wrong, in case of ‘failure’ after return to the country of origin. This 
solution is almost by definition generally unavailable to rejected asylum seekers 
and irregular migrants since they have become the main targets of voluntary 
return programs since 2015. Webber argues that IOM’s successes in AVRR 
programs have been due to this lack of choice for returnees due to their legal 
status which deprives them of the right to stay in the country where they 
sought asylum. As IOM describes it, “the limited duration of temporary 
protected status, for example, has proven to be an effective inducement to 
voluntary return” (2011: 105).8 The widespread use of temporary protection 
status for refugees only increases the number of people facing the prospects of 
removal at some time in the future, and deprives them potentially of any 
choice in staying (especially if the ‘home’ country complies with requests to 
provide travel documents for those returned involuntarily or ‘voluntarily’). 
Returns under AVRR programs do not include the prospect of returning if the 
outcome is not fruitful for the individual concerned. One-way return is the 
only legal and practical choice offered, and in this sense returns under AVRR 
are forceful and coercive, although the violence involved does not usually take 
the form of physical restraint.  
Agency vs. structures, policies, and global organizations 
The agency and mobility of the returnee are also strong determinants of 
voluntariness; however, there seems to be a misunderstanding in how much 
individual agency matters when structural powers, policies and IOs overrule 
 
 
8 IOM, ‘Assisting voluntary return’, available at: 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/assisting-voluntary-return as cited in Webber 2011.  
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individual agency by many means. Drawing on the same interviews used in the 
book described above, van Houte, Siegel and Davids provide a deliberated 
account on return migration centred around the agency of the returnees (van 
Houte et al., 2016). This research concludes that we cannot form a clear 
boundary between voluntary and non-voluntary, but instead suggests how 
“legal constraints, family pressure, economic needs or socio-cultural 
difficulties” (van Houte et al., 2016: 15) can influence return decisions, making 
them not entirely voluntary in the Afghan context. This conclusion is in many 
ways confirmed by the findings of this research, although the role of EU 
member states in influencing return is given greater emphasis than in van 
Houte’s study.  
However, the logic behind van Houte et al.’s study is also questionable 
from another point. These researchers argue that since the returnee still had a 
choice not to return no matter the prospect of severe consequences, such as 
associated with unconformity along the legal requirements, we cannot clearly 
say the return was ‘non-voluntary’. If we apply the same logic to forced 
migration and replace ‘return’ in the quote above, with ‘migration,’ it would 
follow as, since most of the displaced “did have the choice not to” (migrate), 
“however harsh the alternative to” (migrating) “would have been” (van Houte 
et al., 2016: 15). We could also make forced migration sound ‘voluntary’ 
because the displaced always retains the choice to stay and bear with the 
challenges of remaining, however ‘harsh’. The study compares the post 9-11 
returns of ‘early’ arrivals, the post-Cold War asylum seekers who were often 
granted asylum versus ‘late’ arrivals, who arrived after the mid-1990s phase and 
faced far more restrictive asylum policies, and an immigration regime that 
prioritized repatriation and returns. Van Houte’s study provides a useful and 
detailed analysis of returnees’ migration and return narratives, taking into 
account structures, capacities, agency and desire of returnees within the 
decision-making process. In its conclusion that the two groups of returnees 
returned “under different combinations of desires and capacities”, so that the 
latter group were not as able to match their desires and capacity with their 
decision about whether to stay or return, constraining structural realities 
hindered their agency, both to remain, and on return. They latter group of 
former asylum seekers and refugees were also restricted in their capacity to 
return back to their original country of asylum.  
Despite the authors’ claim that desire, capacity and agency are as 
important as structure, in almost all cases analysed by the authors, it is evident 
that structural realities overrule all the other elements. In claiming that all 
actors interviewed for their study show a level of agency over their actions and 
decisions, either by “enhancing their capacities to meet their desires, or by 
redefining their desires to match their capacities” (van Houte et al., 2016: 15), 
the researchers appear to want to escape the main finding of their study.  It 
shows consistently how structural elements are what shape the individual 
actors’ capacities, desires and agency.   
To elaborate further on this discussion and role of structures, Koser and 
Kuschminder have built a specific ‘blended’ approach that divides factors 
influencing return decisions into three categories. They list (i) structural, such 
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as conditions in both country of origin and destination; (ii) individual, such as 
personal characteristics and social relations including the family, and (iii) policy 
interventions such as the AVR and AVRR frameworks that either act as 
incentives or disincentives for return (2015: 13). However, what is clear in their 
study is differentiation based on how powerful each factor is compared to the 
other. The research finds that conditions in the country of origin overpower 
individual, social and policy factors and that among the three conditions in the 
states of origin played the lesser role. Significant determinants in return 
decisions were found by Koser and Kuschminder to be, “the difficulty of 
finding employment/no right to work; being tired of living as an 
undocumented migrant; a desire to reunify with family at home; the 
opportunity to benefit from voluntary return programmes; and job prospects 
at home” (2015: 46). All these factors will be discussed within the findings 
section of this paper when arguments are presented in relation to how 
voluntary the returns have been and the role conditions in the destination or 
origin countries play in softly/indirectly forcing the returnee to ‘choose’ to 
return.  
3.3 Reintegration assistance and sustainable return 
As discussed elsewhere, in policy and practice AVRR, there has been a stronger 
focus on return and not much of the literature, policy and programming has 
been wired towards life after return and reintegration. Generally, there are is a 
lack of standard benchmarks that could be used to measure sustainability of 
return and reintegration. However, to categorize of multiple determinants that 
have been used to depict sustainability of return and reintegration, 
Kuschminder has developed a “multidimensional return and reintegration that 
accounts for both subjective and objective indicators” (2017:10). She lists a 
total of 15 indicators categorized in three dimensions of economic, socio-
cultural and safety and security dimensions (2017: 10).9,10,11 Scoring of 
reintegration experiences of 156 returnees’ experience of reintegration showed 
that only 37 percent had reintegrated across all dimensions confirming to the 
difficulty of reintegration and its multifaceted nature. In a study on AVRs from 
Norway to Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Kosovo, Strand et al.’s 
scores reintegration based on returnee’s self-assessment of their return 
sustainability and four categories including sustainable, volatile, and 
unsustainable return, or remigration (Strand et al., 2016). Findings of this 
research also showed a very low level of self-perceived sustainability of return 
 
 
9 “employment, income sources, perceived economic situation, debt, ownership of 
land or house” (Kuschminder, 2017: 10). 
10 “networks, transnational networks, participation in local events, self- perception of 
personal life, membership in organization upon return” (Kuschminder, 2017: 10). 
11 “perceived safety in home, perceived safety in the community, trust in the govern-




and reintegration. Reimmigration intentions as a determinant of ‘sustainability’ 
of return has also been used by another study about AVRs from Austria to 
Kosovo which found a high number of respondents (44%) with the intention 
to leave again (ICMPD, 2015: 18). Similar results showing ‘unsustainable’ 
return have been found in case of Afghanistan as well where a high number of 
both AVRs and forced returnees were found to remigrate again (Schuster and 
Majidi, 2013; Strand et al., 2016; Koser and Kuschminder, 2015; Kuschminder, 
2017).  
Return ‘home’: end of the migration cycle?  
The level of preparedness and the chances of resource mobilization for a 
successful return also relates to how much one could define migration as 
reversible, with return meaning return ‘home.’ A misconception is that return 
migration comes at the end of a longer migration cycle and that returnees will 
experience the country of origin as ‘home’. Hammond (1999) criticizes this 
assumption, of return as the end of the migration cycle, since it leads to 
policymakers and scholars forgetting or overlooking what happens next, the 
life after return. She argues that the language used in policy making and 
program implementation in relation to assistance and reintegration after return 
is misleading. Her arguments align with discussions about the conditions in the 
countries of origin, and hence the potentially negative consequences of return 
without preparedness of the context to absorb the ‘returned’ members who 
might not fit either. As she puts it:  
Without taking proper preparedness and social security measures (such as 
constructing schools and clinics, creating employment opportunities, and 
providing other services), repatriating large numbers of people to an area of 
chronic poverty and food insecurity may accelerate the general slide of an already 
poor population into a condition of even greater economic vulnerability 
(Hammond, 1999: 2).  
This statement is returned to later as we examine the argument that return 
of Afghan asylum seekers and forced migrants, especially in large numbers, 
given the thousands of returns from Pakistan and Iran, can produce negative 
results, damaging prospects for reintegration and possibly even worsening the 
overall security and socio-economic situation in Afghanistan. Both Hammond 
(1999) and Cassarino (2004) thus provide useful insights from a theoretical 
perspective, into how return and post-return processes can be defined, making 
it possible to include the adverse effects on the individual, the family and 
community and the state of forced, unassisted returns. The role of 
voluntariness and preparedness in sustainability of return and reintegration are 
both highlighted in these theories, which challenges the assumption that return 
equates to ‘homecoming’ and a durable solution to displacement. Instead, 
Hammond asserts that return is a new beginning and that post return situations 
needs to be given more attention (Hammond 1999). Regarding terminologies, 
Hammond even argues that terms such as ‘returnee’ and ‘return’ can be 
misleading, since they imply that there is something inherent in the place 
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individuals are ‘returned’ to that makes it more ‘home’ than the place they have 
come from or tried to settle in (Hammond 1999).  
3.4 Conclusion  
Returns are not only affected by returnees and their choices or lack of choices, 
but by local and international policies and agencies that act as push or pull 
factors in (constrained) return decisions. The AVR and AVRR programs and 
EU development aid and development policies within the Afghan context, 
make JWF a perfect example of international migration management and 
governance based on unequal power relations. In this context, as show in 
Chapter 1, the EU, IOM, and the Afghan government are the main actors; 
returnee migrants the objects of policy as well as supposed ‘subjects’ with 
‘choices’. Their decisions are structured through inter-agency bargaining and 
deal-making regarding returns, development funds, diplomatic ties, investment 
and so on. In the next chapter, I will present the findings of the research 
including general information about the research participants, and a detailed 
discussion about the voluntariness and assistance of return drawing on the 
determinants discussed above.  
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 4 Voluntary and assisted? A narrative analysis  
4.1 Introduction  
One of the main objectives of this research is to analyse the characteristics of 
the returns that have taken place under the AVR and AVRR programmes to 
see if they have involved ‘voluntary return’ as is claimed, and to what extent 
return has been adequately ‘assisted’. Before assessing this through the 
narratives of returnees, it is important to note some characteristics of voluntary 
return according to IOM and UNHCR guidelines. The IOM, as the main actor 
implementing AVRR programmes contrasts with the more human rights-based 
definition of what is ‘voluntary’ used by UNHCR. AVR, as defined by IOM 
involves “administrative, logistical or financial support, including reintegration 
assistance, to migrants unable or unwilling to remain in the host country or 
country of transit and who decide to return to their country of origin”. This 
gives a hint of what IOM means by ‘voluntary,’ and shows their acceptance of 
‘push’ factors in the host country as part of the return decision. IOM bases this 
definition of voluntariness on two conditions: 
(a) freedom of choice, which is defined by the absence of physical or psychological 
pressure to enrol in an assisted voluntary return and reintegration programme; and 
(b) an informed decision which requires the availability of timely, unbiased and 
reliable information upon which to base the decision (IOM Glossary on 
Migration, emphasis added).  
By implication, legal or administrative pressure to enrol is not covered in 
this definition. However, the majority of those returned and interviewed for 
this research would seem to qualify for ‘refugee’ status under the terms defined 
by the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol. Therefore, the criteria of 
voluntary repatriation as defined by UNHCR are also relevant here. The 
UNHCR considers that for return to be truly voluntary,  
positive pull-factors in the country of origin are an overriding element in the 
refugees' decision to return rather than possible push-factors in the host country 
or negative pull-factors, such as threats to property, in the home country 
(UNHCR Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation, 1996).12  
The voluntariness in this sense of AVR-type returns has been questioned 
by Gibney who labels IOM-type returns as ‘nominally voluntary returns’ 
(2008). As discussed in Chapter 3, AVR returns have been equated with ‘soft-
deportation’ (i.e. deportation but without the element of overt physical force), 
due to evidence that decisions to return are often imposed on individuals by 
their lack of other options, and by states’ insistence on failed asylum seekers’ 
obligation to depart because of their (il)legal status in the country where they 
sought asylum, an illegal status that the same government has imposed on 






In relation to assistance, we should first consider choosing to participate in 
assisted voluntary return and reintegration programs and choosing to return as 
two different kinds of decisions that might be assisted. The former does not 
necessarily imply a permanent solution to displacement or positive 
reintegration successes, whilst the latter more often may lead to reintegration in 
the community with comparatively less inclination to re-emigrate. Decisions to 
return which arise from an exercise of positive agency on the part of the 
returnee in the decision-making process, are associated with his or her greater 
preparedness and the willingness and ability to make plans for resource 
mobilization in the process of return. These are prerequisites for assisted 
return to have ‘successful’ outcomes for post-return reintegration. Since many 
factors other than the desire to return oblige and structure the failed asylum 
seekers’ participation in return programs, planning and willingness may be 
completely or relatively lacking, affecting resource mobilisation and 
reintegration prospects in turn. Taking away the legal and administrative right 
to remain in the country of former asylum, and policing the duty not to remain 
are forms of political intervention by host states that leave the individuals thus 
‘administered’ or ‘detained’, little choice but to decide to participate in return 
schemes, since they are not free to decide to stay instead.  
In the findings presented in this chapter, a clear distinction emerges 
between two groups. On the one hand are those Afghans who initially 
migrated due to external factors, in other words, those who were forced to flee 
their homes, and on the other hand, those for whom the decision as to 
whether to stay or leave their home country was considered a matter of choice. 
For those whose initial reason for flight was fear, persecution, and a matter of 
survival, their return was generally also forced, and was correspondingly less 
likely to be ‘successful’ or sustainable. On the other hand, individuals who were 
not forced to flee their homes in the first place, had mainly been curious about 
living conditions in Europe or elsewhere, and were originally encouraged to 
migrate by friends and family members. They, by contrast, were often 
considerably happier about returning ‘home’, and did not usually regret their 
initial departure, often expressing views that suggest they felt they had learned 
valuable lessons from their journeys in other countries, including their time in 
EU member states. This in turn made it more likely that their return would be 
‘successful’ and sustainable.  
4.2 Presenting the research respondents 
Most of the interviewees whose narratives inform this research were young 
men between the ages of 18 and 42, their average age being around 26. The age 
of those returned confirms the general findings of other research that it is most 
often young men who constitute the bulk of ‘unwanted’ migrants, viewed as 
‘undeserving’ of refugee status. They are also the ones mainly targeted through 
IOM AVR programs (Brun, 2017; Zetter, 2007). Table 1 below shows the 
breakdown in ages of the selected respondents, showing that three quarters of 







Age distribution of interviewees 
Age Number of participants 
< and 20 5 
21 to 30 13 
31 to 40 6 
41 = and < 1 
Source: interview data 
Table 2 
Disaggregation based on Country of Return 
Country of return Number of participants Eurostat Return % 
(2015-2018) 
Austria 20% 6% 
Belgium  4% 2% 
Bulgaria 4% 5% 
France 4% 11% 
Germany 24% 22% 
Norway 28% 6% 
Sweden 16% 17% 
Source: interview data. 
 
Since the research participants were selected based on purposive and 
snowball sampling, the country from which they were returned was mainly 
confined to one of seven European Union member states: Austria (5), Belgium 
(1), Bulgaria (1), France (1), Germany (6), Sweden (4) and one non-EU 
member state in the European Free Trade Area – Norway (7). This 
disaggregation is based on country from which they were returned, with 
Austria, Germany, Norway and Sweden being where most of the respondents 
were returned from. These figures align more or less with the overall numbers 
of returns depicted in Eurostat which shows that about 70 percent of such 
returns to Afghanistan being from these states with the other two major states 
being Greece (8 percent) and the UK (10 percent). Even though the sample of 
25 research respondents is relatively small, this sample nonetheless constitutes 
a representative group of Afghans in terms of reflecting the total numbers 
returned from different European countries and EU member states. Even 
though as is discussed later, not all returnees were living in Afghanistan before 
their initial flight towards Europe, almost all were from just 9 of the 34 
provinces in Afghanistan. During the time of the interviews, which took place 
in the second half of 2018, 20 (80 percent) of the 25 participants were 
unemployed. The other five either had on and off part-time employment or 






Provinces of origin of returnees 








Maidan Wardak 3 
Uruzgan 3 
Total 25 
Source: interview data. 
 
4.2 Migration experience 
Of these 25 participants, 15 listed poor security and violent conflict in 
Afghanistan or in their home region, as the main reason they initially fled the 
country, sometimes to Iran and later to Europe, and sometimes directly to 
Europe. Another 5 participants listed major human rights violations like 
religious or ethnic persecution as the main reason for their flight. A further 2 
listed personal and family enmity as the main reason. These statics are 
provided in the Figure 3 below for a better presentation. 
Figure 3 
Primary reason of flight 
 
Source: interview data. 
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Based on their descriptions of their own migration journeys, 20 of the 25 
participants clearly describe their flight to be forced by an external push factor. 
The remaining 3 participants listed ‘peer pressure’ are the main reason for their 
departure, and their migration was considered voluntary in terms of this study, 
since all three said their economic conditions had played a major role in 
motivating their migration to Europe, rather than any form of political or 
group persecution. Secondary factors influencing flight from Afghanistan 
reported by the 25 participants were the poor economic conditions in the 
country (6 cases), unemployment (6), discrimination and lack of access to basic 
rights in Iran (3), persecution of and discrimination against ethnic minorities in 
Afghanistan (2), and poor access to education (2). Again, this is depicted in the 
Figure 4 below.  
Figure 4 
Provinces of origin of returnees 
 
Source: interview data. 
 
These asylum seekers had remained in the country where they had applied 
for asylum for an average of 22 months and two weeks, with the least being the 
person who was deported a week after he had applied for asylum since it was 
the third time he had travelled to Europe and second time he had applied for 
asylum in France and longest being the person who had travelled to Norway in 
2009 and was returned after his asylum was rejected in 2016. Most of the 
respondents had fled Afghanistan or Iran in 2015 (20 out of 24) and most were 
returned in 2016 (12 out of 24).   
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4.4 Denied asylum: the lack of alternatives 
Many interviewees stated outright that they were forced to return. Others 
described how having their asylum claims rejected, and being severely 
restricted in terms of their access to rights to work, health, housing and other 
amenities as a result, all played a role in their decision to sign ‘voluntary return’ 
papers. One example is Akbar (not his real name) who states he was initially 
not willing to return. However, he did finally agree to return, due to problems 
with his legal right to remain. During the interview, Akbar says: 
I wasn’t willing to return but they told me that we will kick you out of the camp 
and you won’t have the right to work. If the police catch you anywhere, you will 
be arrested and will be deported to Afghanistan while handcuffed. However, if 
you return voluntarily, we will assist you with 2500 USD. That’s why I decided to 
return through the forced voluntary return scheme (sic, male, Norway, 2014, 
2016).13, 14 
His interesting phrase ‘forced voluntary return’ hints at the contradiction 
around the ‘voluntariness’ of his participation in the return scheme he signed 
up to, given the prospects of far worse he was threatened with by those 
providing him with the prospect of being forcibly returned while ‘handcuffed’. 
I get back later to returnees’ narrative of voluntariness. However, what his 
account shows is how his not having any legal right to remain in the ‘host’ 
country became a force that removed any other option he could see, other than 
agreeing to the ‘least bad’ option of returning ‘home’ via IOM. Nasim was 
returned from Norway, and describes the harsh treatment used to persuade 
Afghanis to participate in return schemes. As he puts it, “They make the 
conditions so hard that you will give in for voluntary return. Besides, those 
who do not resist are treated much better” (sic, male, Norway, 2009, 2016).  
Adil has twice tried to commit suicide, and was about to be admitted to a 
psychological ward for severe depression in Germany, when this had to be 
stopped since his asylum request was rejected and he was obliged to ‘agree’ to 
be removed/deported/returned instead of receiving psychiatric care.  Many 
interviewees described how the very basic monthly payments they would 
receive for food and clothing and the health care and educational services they 
had had provided for them and their families would stop, often as soon as their 
asylum claim had been rejected the first time. They were then not legally 
allowed to work, and in many cases were also legally required to leave the 
country within a month of the decision, depending on whether there was a 
right of appeal. In some countries, they had no right to remain, and this 
further, punitive withdrawal of any rights to continue to live legally and settle, 
had more impact than their rejection of their asylum application as such.  
Even before their asylum claims were rejected, the asylum procedures 
themselves could involve lengthy and very uncertain periods and poor 
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condition in some countries, especially in Greece and Italy.  Closed camps– 
where those seeking asylum were obliged to remain–were another element that 
led many rejected asylum seekers to give up on their asylum claims even before 
any decision had been made and choose instead to return before their claims 
had been processed.  
In short, removing the legal right to stay, even if it does not directly put 
physical pressure on the rejected asylum seeker, does violate even IOM 
guideline since it can result in extreme psychological pressure and destitution, 
as well as continued and prolonged detention in some countries. This can 
amount to a strong push factor, as UNHCR defines it, from the host country, 
violating the definition of voluntary favoured by the UNHCR. This leads to 
questioning whether voluntariness is being practiced in such returns.   
4.5 Poor asylum procedures  
To wait in ‘mismanaged’ camps for uncertain and unfair asylum  
or return? 
Of the 25 research participants, 17 had either decided to take part in the AVR 
and AVRR programmes or felt obliged or even forced to do so once their 
asylum applications were rejected and they lost any legal right to stay in the 
country of asylum. Yet quite a significant number, 8 out of 25, had agreed to 
return even before they received any response to their asylum request from the 
host government. One reason given was the prospect of a prolonged waiting 
period for themselves and seeing other people suffering in camps for years, 
including families. The asylum seekers often witnessed others already waiting 
for years. For example, Ahmad, an asylum applicant in Austria who was 
returned later, reports that another asylum seeker in a camp in Austria was 
reported to have waited 15 years to finally be granted asylum. Besides, Ahmad 
explained how asylum seekers in Austria had to go to a church on a weekly 
basis to get both food and donated clothes, and described the situation of 
another camp inmate, there since 2009, still waiting despite receiving two 
negative decisions. As Ahmed said: “His physical and psychological condition 
was not good. His head would shake and at times, he would get very restless 
and impatient” (Ahmad, Austria, 2015, 2016).  
When Ahmed visits the Afghan embassy in Vienna to inquire about his 
uncertain situation, they check the databases and inform him that his first 
interview is likely to be in 2018. He then realizes “the stark contrast between 
the conditions of the camps and the facilities and luxuries of the city”, and 
decides to apply for voluntary return without waiting another two years for his 
interview to be possibly scheduled, or possibly not (Ahmad, Austria, 2015, 
2016). He had already waited for nine months and now had to anticipate at 
least one more year before his first interview could be scheduled. This long 
wait, with few chances of being allowed to stay left him with no other choice 
but to agree to voluntary return. All those respondents who had agreed to 
voluntary return even before a decision was made on their asylum claim, 
complained that asylum procedures themselves were far too lengthy and also 
very uncertain. Seeing the situation of others who had suffered for many years, 
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and despite waiting were still left in limbo, years later, with their life on hold, 
and no asylum decision on their case, living with families or alone in poorly-
managed camps, was something that proved so frustrating and discouraging 
that even ‘voluntary’ return seemed preferable. Shakir, another asylum seeker 
in Germany describes the difficult conditions of the asylum process and how it 
had made AVR more compelling than to wait: 
Before I got deported, one of the social workers suggested that I convert to 
Christianity for my asylum to get accepted. I did not accept it since it was against 
my faith even though I did not want to return to Afghanistan. However, due to 
the uncertainty and the poor psychological condition even after having waited for 
so long. Almost 6 to 7 years is not less but I filled out the form (sic, male, 
Germany, 2010, 2016).  
The term used here ‘deported’ belies the difference often made between 
such agreed-to returns and forced deportations. A life put ‘on hold’ during the 
difficult and lengthy process of asylums being requested, is even worse when 
for months and years one is confined within a poorly-run camp, living in 
conditions where denial of basic services plays an instrumental and ‘deterrent’ 
role, deliberately designed to dissuade those who wish to remain. In many 
interviews, it was found that lack of access to services and rights, especially the 
right to work, in the country of asylum, was a significant ‘push factor’ that led 
Afghan men to participate in assisted voluntary return schemes. One 
respondent, Jalil expresses it this way: 
I slipped on ice during winter which hurt my knee. When I visited the doctor, 
they did not care about it clearly describing that since I was not accepted and 
during an active asylum process, we cannot do anything about your leg…I 
remained in the poor health condition for two years until the decision on my 
asylum request. It was rejected and I was returned to Afghanistan with an injured 
leg (Rejected asylum seeker returned from Norway, male, 2015).  
In many cases, not having the legal right to work during the asylum 
process places great additional pressure on most asylum seekers, especially 
since many borrowed money for their original journey and remain responsible 
for taking care of immediate and at times extended families at home. A 
research respondent shared how working illegally had cost him a serious injury. 
Instead of helping him, the employer had used this injury to threaten to let the 
authorities know that he worked illegally. Such conditions place great 
psychological pressure on asylum seekers and make it even harder for them to 
tolerate the long waiting period between the application and the decision being 
known. Such waiting periods can take years, sometimes placing pressure on 
people so that AVR programs look more attractive than they would otherwise 
be. As Webber explains: 
Repatriation cannot be termed ‘voluntary’ where the alternative is utter 
destitution, with denial of accommodation, basic support and the opportunity to 
work, or the prospect of children being taken into care or months or years in 
detention…nor can it be ‘voluntary’ where the prospect of obtaining recognition 
as a refugee has become remote because the system for the determination of 
asylum claims and appeals is deliberately underfunded, depriving increasing 
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numbers of asylum seekers of any legal representation for this supremely 
important legal decision (Webber 2011: 104).  
Most of these features of interlinkages between the decision to agree to 
return and hard conditions under asylum processes, were mentioned by most 
respondents, who also complained that especially during 2015 and 2016, when 
pressures on asylum offices was greater than usual, Afghan refugees were 
treated particularly unfairly, and the grave conditions they had experienced at 
home, and their equal right to fair international protection arrangements, were 
being routinely denied. Of the 20 respondents who answered a question about 
whether their asylum application was processed fairly, 19 (95%) defined the 
process as unfair. Only one of the twenty said he considered the process fair 
enough.  
In many cases, the Afghan men’s sense of fairness of their applications 
and how they were treated overall was based on a comparison with Syrian 
refugees, whose applications were being ‘prioritized’ and considered more 
‘deserving’ during the period 2015-2016 in particular. One interviewee, Sultan 
articulated that, “the conditions of asylum application is not fair…for one 
person, application gets accepted [after] 15 years and the other in the earliest 
time possible…I couldn’t take it, so I volunteered to return” (sic, male, Austria, 
2015, 2016). 
Through deterrence policies practiced by EU member states and other 
‘host’ governments, legal stay in the host country and access to all kinds of 
rights and services are restricted, limiting options for those in the asylum 
system, so return can be seen as less ‘voluntary’. Returns under such punitive 
conditions are considered ‘compelled return’ by Cassarino, who defines this as 
a return to one’s “country of origin as a result of unfavourable circumstances 
and factors which abruptly interrupt the migration cycle” (Cassarino 2008: 
113). Kuschminder (2017) describes the logic of deliberately depriving failed 
asylum seekers of legal rights, including the right to remain, and withdrawing 
basic services that could make their lives more comfortable. He states that such 
policies are based on the assumption made by European governments “that 
forcing rejected asylum seekers and irregular migrants to live in destitution will 
increase their willingness to participate in AVR” (Kuschminder 2017: 265). 
Other studies on AVRs, like that of van Houte, more or less ignore the way 
that such cruelties that aim at obliging people to leave, are calculated by 
governments, and implemented accordingly.  
Overall, this section has shown that what can clearly be categorised as 
push factors from the host society are strongly inhibiting any ‘free choice’ and 
therefore any ‘voluntariness’ of return in those whose interview narratives are 
quoted here. Intensifying push factors deliberately by removing rights, and 
imposing destitution, tends to limit any alterative options that rejected asylum 
seekers may have, leading them almost inevitably to consider giving in and 
reluctantly ‘agreeing’ to return, either by themselves, or by taking part in an 
AVR or AVRR program.  
35 
 
Return with a free fight ticket: deportation 
After rejection of their asylum applications, Afghan citizens subject to return 
are not given a proper choice but are set on a time limit to return ‘voluntarily’. 
In many cases, before these individuals are ready or willing to return, they are 
forced through different ways which gives these returns deportation-like 
qualities. While many were financially assisted with their return, through being 
provided with air tickets and some support in re-establishing themselves in the 
country through cash and in-kind support, the majority of those returned felt 
they were dealt with more or less like deportees. In total, more than half of all 
respondents (13) said they were first taken to a detention and/or deportation 
centre before boarding the plane, even though their return was supposed to be 
voluntary and therefore agreed. Four mentioned they were escorted by police 
(just as the JWF described in its provisions, discussed earlier in Chapter 2). 
Two were handcuffed, and as the worst example of ‘voluntariness’, two 
reported having been forced through threats of worse, to sign the papers that 
said they agreed to voluntary return. The eight people who reported they had 
been confined in a detention centre prior to return, had been kept there for an 
average of 44 days, for as little as six days to as much as three months. 
Detention prior to return seems to contradict the whole spirit and meaning of 
the term ‘voluntary’, as commonly understood, let alone the IOM and 
UNHCR definitions. Norway was comparatively depicted to have the harshest 
means of return. Of the 13 respondents who reported use of deportation 
centres 6 were returned from Norway. It is noteworthy to mention that there 
was a total of 7 interviews with returnees from Norway and 6 had reported 
such.  One interviewee Jamal elaborates: 
I wasn’t ready to return; however, the government of this country came to our 
camp at night and took me to the deportation centre at the Airport. I remained 
there for about five days and then was deported to Afghanistan (sic, male, 
Norway, 2014, 2016).  
Similarly, Mukhtar portrays his experience as:  
When I received the negative response to my asylum request, I was definitely not 
willing to return, however the government of this country (Norway) came to the 
camp at night, took me with them to the deportation centre at the airport, I 
remained there for about five days and then was deported to Afghanistan. The 22 
forced deportees had 44 police who escorted us to the airport in Kabul (sic, male, 
Norway, 2015, 2016).  
Hamid gives us another example of how AVR returns happen. He 
describes that he was still awaiting the third decision on his asylum request, 
when immigration police entered his room in the camp at 3:00 am in the 
morning, handcuffed him and took him to the deportation centre without 
giving him the chance even to collect his belongings. He describes feeling 
badly treated:  
…we were treated like dangerous criminals and like if they released us, we would 
escape. We were kept in tiny rooms in the detention centre without having any 
kind of permission to go out…until we (with 22 other forced returnees) were 
escorted all the way to the airport in Kabul (Hamid, Germany, 2015, 2018).  
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What emerges from such accounts of return is that returns do have most 
of the characteristics of ‘forced removals’ or deportation. I agree with 
Kuschminder’s argument in this regards that migration policies such as the 
Joint Way Forward have legitimized such forcible return policies, under the 
name of voluntary return schemes, and this has enabled European countries to 
routinely forcibly return rejected Afghan asylum seekers, whilst claiming that 
through IOM the process is guaranteed to be taking place without coercion 
and following consent (in Weinar et al. 2019). Another rejected asylum seeker 
Omid’s account confirms this perception: 
After spending [time] in a closed off camp for three weeks, they took me to the 
deportation centre and forced me to sign the papers leaving me no other 
choice…On the day I had the flight, there were five other deportees with me, 
and we were handcuffed which were opened in the plane. I was paid 352 USD in 
the plane and was told that I will receive 10,000 Kroner in Kabul (sic, male, 
Norway, 2015, 2017).  
Whilst this mention of financial assistance, actual and offered in Omid’s 
case, covers part of the objectives of AVRR programmes, his description of 
what took place, and the details provided by other interviewees suggest that at 
the very least, the ‘V’ for ‘voluntary’ should sometimes be omitted from the 
acronym AVR, when return become ‘Assisted Returns’ but is far from 
voluntary. At other times, AVR and AVRR really does help those who are 
genuinely willing and prepared to return, and who are committed to re-
establishing themselves in their return community. Under such conditions 
(which apply to relatively few failed asylum seekers, if our sample is anything to 
go by) such programmes can be really effective for cases whereas IOM puts it, 
‘stranded migrants’ are provided the assistance to return. However, in other 
cases where there is very little choice and informed decision making is involved 
from the returnee such as rejected asylum seeker’s side, (forceful) 
implementation of these programmes hardly make any sense but can only lead 
to worsened conditions of the migrant and the country of origin. Labelling all 
types of returns voluntary and assisted, that may be neither one nor the other, 
can also negatively affect the reputation of AVR programs and their potential 
to attract those with a genuine wish to go back ‘home’, the very few who are 
not being driven to that choice by a combination of ‘push’ factors in the host 
country.  
As mentioned above, Norway was reported as the country most often 
using deportation/detention centres for AVR returns (in 6 of 7 cases 
recorded). Descriptions of similar mistreatment of asylum seekers and of 
subjecting them to intimidation by forcing them to sign the papers was 
associated with Bulgaria (only one respondent interviewed who was returned 
from Bulgaria), a country which was also reported as very unfair in its manner 
of reviewing asylum. For example, Jawad complained about bias in treatment 
of male asylum seekers, when he was separated from his family in Bulgaria. He 
explains that, in that country: 
…they force you to sign asylum papers without even reviewing your case. After 
eight months, we (the respondent, his sister and mother) escaped the camps to 
Germany. However, two months later when they found that our biometric 
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information had already been registered in Bulgaria, they rejected my asylum in 
Germany and deported me back to Bulgaria. The asylum process was very unfair 
and actually kind of cruel because my sister and mother’s cases were reviewed in 
Germany and I was deported back. Once back, I was kept like a prisoner at the 
deportation centre in Sofia for nine days before my return to Afghanistan. What’s 
painful is that even when IOM provided me with the voluntary return papers and 
I had signed them, they [still] treated me like a prisoner (male, Bulgaria 2016, 
2018).  
In such cases, return is labelled and legitimized as “assisted voluntary 
return” just because some financial assistance is provided for the returnee, and 
despite his return having taken place under conditions almost identical to 
deportation. As discussed previously in Chapter 3, one characteristic of 
genuinely voluntary return is that it should be based on an informed decision. 
The informed basis for the decision to return by asylum seekers can be 
questioned when they are more or less ‘sentenced’ to return, after being forced 
to sign documents to say their return is voluntary. Even if they come to know 
of new information during the process, and then regret their earlier decision to 
sign, even if under duress, they are not allowed to change their minds. One 
example is Abrar, who had been waiting for his asylum decision for almost a 
year in an asylum camp in Austria, along with 600 other individuals. He decides 
he cannot cope with the uncertainty of his situation for what may be years to 
come, and with leaving his family alone all that time in Kabul. So, he signs up 
for voluntary return. Later he regrets his decision, after a huge explosion in 
Kabul makes him concerned about escalating violence at home. He is not able 
to cancel his agreement to return, however, and is provided with a return ticket 
that he is obliged to use (Abrar, Austria, 2015, 2016). After he returns, Abrar’s 
brother is killed in a suicide attack in Dehmazang Square in Kabul. Abrar then 
takes his own and his brothers’ family to Pakistan to apply for asylum there. 
He gets robbed by individuals claiming to provide refugee-related services, and 
his claim for asylum is subsequently rejected by the UNHCR office, which 
does not accept asylum applications in Pakistan. Abrar subsequently returned 
to Kabul, where he supports both his own and his brother’s family and 
continues his ‘life’ under the ‘sentence’ bestowed upon him by Austrian 
government to return and live in Afghanistan.   
4.6 Reintegration assistance  
Reintegration assistance provided upon return has been used to legitimize 
returns under AVRR programmes, and in order to enhance the impression that 
such returns are justified from a sustainability and development perspective. 
From respondents’ narratives it was clear that many had not received assistance 
on return. Some had received some kinds of assistance, yet in many cases they 
themselves suggested during interviews that since they were voluntarily 
returning, they were not supposed to receive assistance on return. This 
narrative shows considerable confusion over implementation of AVRs and 
leads to questioning the extent of returnees’ ‘informed decision-making’ in 
AVRs.   
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It seems that the main priority of AVRs is return from Europe, rather 
than reintegration into Afghan society and economy as such. That return is the 
primary AVRR priority under the JWF can be relatively easily deduced from a 
closer review of comparative investments in returning individuals on the one 
hand and providing them with assistance they need in efforts to re-establish 
themselves once they are back in Afghanistan. Of 25 research participants, all 
were helped ‘home’ on their journey with at least one single air ticket back to 
Afghanistan. Of the total number, 16 (64%) reported having received all (13) 
or part (3) of the financial assistance they had been promised when they signed 
the agreement to return. The other 9 were either not promised any assistance 
or not provided with any assistance promised, once they arrived in 
Afghanistan. None of the 25 received any longer-term support in the form of 
follow up funding to ensure their livelihoods were contributing to their 
reintegration after their return.   
All 24 other interviewees said their lives in Afghanistan had worsened 
immensely since they originally left. Many were still heavily indebted because 
of the huge expense of the failed journey to Europe. In many cases, incentive 
packages which Webber calls a ‘bribe’ are nowhere near the average cost of the 
journey to Europe and give an impression that the rejected asylum seekers’ life 
is ‘being bought’ cheap (Webber 2011: 105). Based on AHRDO’s calculations 
on the basis of talking with a total of 45 returned asylum seekers/deportees, it 
cost each person on average around 11,200 USD, the minimum being 2,000 
USD and the highest 40,000 USD. This was the cost of travelling, one way, to 
an asylum destination in Europe (AHRDO 2019: 17). Given these huge costs, 
it seems surprising that so many failed asylum seekers, or even asylum seekers 
with on-going claims, were persuaded to agree to return. This was mainly due 
to hopelessness at ever getting permanent legal status and the right to remain, 
or access to rights and resources. By offering even relatively modest incentives 
attached to return, some were desperate enough to be persuaded to agree to 
AVR.  
Salim applies to return from Austria through an ‘assisted voluntary return’ 
programme. However, the assistance he receives is limited to the ‘return’ part 
and consists only of the flight tickets he is provided with. His narrative is that: 
Based on the policies of this country, I was not eligible for assistance…Austrian 
authorities only provided me with a ticket for return to Afghanistan. However, 
since I had volunteered to return to the country, I wasn’t entitled to any 
assistance. Nobody even asked me about my living conditions after return, let 
alone receiving any help from the government of Afghanistan (Salim, male, 
Austria, 2015, 2016).  
Due to rising unemployment, Salim is currently working as a bodyguard 
for an MP in Kabul, which he considers a very dangerous job, since he can be 
killed at any moment in an attack. He says he cannot return to his place of 
origin due to insecurity and threats from the Taliban in his home area. 
Another asylum seeker, Jawad, was returned from Germany to Bulgaria 
under the Dublin Rules and then returned to Afghanistan after his asylum 
request was rejected. His is another case where the assistance was focused 
entirely on return and there was no financial provision at all for the 
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reintegration, the second R in AVRR. There is an uncertainty in the 
understanding of returnees about their eligibility for assistance. Once again, 
this ambiguity is revealed through Jawad’s explanation of his situation:  
Since I was a forced deportee, I was in no way assisted by the German, Bulgarian 
or Afghan governments. I had heard from others that if you return voluntarily, 
you will get some cash to assist you. I did inquire from the IOM office in 
Bulgaria but did not hear back. I did the same with the IOM in Kabul; however, 
they told me I was not eligible. When I asked why, they didn’t tell me a reason 
even though my name was identified in the ‘voluntary returns’ list. I only signed 
beside my name as they asked (Jawad, male, 2016, 2018).  
The confusion about who is entitled to assistance and who is voluntary 
and who is forced, is evident from this statement, which expresses great 
confusion at who is eligible or not, and for what.  Since most returns to 
Afghanistan after 2016 were enabled through the JWF with IOM at its 
forefront, such ambiguity around the policies should not persist. It also shows 
that the main concern of IOM and AVRR is to legitimize returns without 
making adequate provisions for financial support to improve returnees’ post-
return living conditions or to support their livelihoods. This is reported by 
interviewees, even though the JWF and AVRR programs clearly state that such 
support is crucial to the program’s success. Jawad’s narrative not only makes 
the mistaken assumption that “since I volunteered to return, I was not entitled 
to the assistance…”, it also does so after stating that he was a “forced 
deportee”; when he tries to understand the rules, he is met with blank 
indifference that suggests transparency may not be the goal of all those in the 
IOM when it comes to returnees like Jawad.  
Return sustainability for development 
Even though the JWF and AVRR programmes in general focus on 
sustainability as an integral part of the return process, this has hardly been the 
case with the 25 interview participants. This is particularly important since a 
much-vaunted part of the entire JWF and return programs, has been to ensure 
the much-needed young and working-age individuals become ‘agents of 
change’ and enablers of development. Yet for many returnees neither has 
reintegration been possible, nor has their return been sustainable so that they 
can contribute and give back to their communities. Since there is next to no 
‘preparation’ for return, adverse results are the consequence. Two returnees 
still had family members in Iran and had moved there after returning from 
Europe, only to find themselves caught up in expulsion measures being 
enforced by the Iranian government. Of 25 returnees interviewed for this 
research, eight had initially lived in Iran. 10 of the 25 (40 percent) were unable 
to return to their home regions, the place they had been settled in before they 
were forced to flee. For example, one interviewee describes the poor security 
conditions of the country and his inability to return to his origin: 
I can’t return to my province because there is no security on the way. Three 
months ago, my aunt’s family was hijacked on the Ghor-Herat highway and were 
fired at. It was on media but the government did not show any reaction while the 
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rejection of our asylum request is directly related to the agreement between the 
Afghan government and European states since it was because of Ghani’s 
decision that I was deported and the eligibility conditions of acceptance has 
gotten much difficult (male, Norway, 2015, 2016).  
The conditions of the living in Afghanistan and lack of security and other 
services makes prospects of reintegration and re-establishment of the returnees 
very unlikely. The majority (18 out of 25) of the interviewees reported about 
their intention to save money and re-migrate, either return to Iran or back 
towards Europe. For most of the seven interviewees who had decided to stay 
in Afghanistan, most had a voluntary initial flight (all three who had said they 
were pressured into leaving by friends) or they had dire phycological or 
economic conditions due to their journey (3 reported large debts or severe 
depression or frustration in European policies) or many years wasted on a 
‘failed case’ (one had waited for six and another for three years). However, 
since most of the research participants were either planning or had wished to 
re-emigrate again, the main reason they listed was insecurity, uncertainty of a 
proper future especially related to education and employment, human rights 
violation and persecution of and discrimination against ethnic minorities.  As a 
research participant is quoted, “I will not be staying in Afghanistan since they 
don’t consider us human beings. Since I have returned no one has care or 
asked how my life has been.” … (male, Norway, 2015, 2017). 
Another example is Jawad who was separated from his sister and mother 
who are still waiting for their asylum to be processed in Germany even though 
he was deported back to Bulgaria due to the Dublin law. He is currently living 
in secret with his fiancé so that his relatives do not come to know that he was 
deported after his asylum was rejected. He says that, “if my situation continues 
like this that I can’t find employment despite being capable and literate, I will 
have no choice but to re-migrate. I am even willing to live illegally in Europe as 
long as my life is not in danger and I have a minimal income for a simple life” 
(Jawad, male, 2016, 2018).  
Finding no prospects and life getting worse after return has been a reason 
why many are interested in taking the route towards Europe once again despite 
all the challenges and hardships they had listed to have faced during the 
journey. A research participant describes this condition very well through an 
excerpt of his interview: 
Afghanistan readmitting the returnees is not right because the condition of 
people in Afghanistan is very bad. The government should first facilitate a better 
living condition and employment opportunities, and then request the deportation 
of people …There can be death in every moment of life in this country and every 
moment is hell…there is no greater danger than insecurity and poverty 
happening together…so when my family and I are able to, we won’t stay here 
another moment (Ahmad, Austria, 2015, 2016).  
Most of the respondents reported that they are still in-debt due to the 
expenses of their journey to Europe but as soon as they get their financial 
stability back and can save a little, they will be on their way to either a 
neighbouring country or Europe where they can see a safer and manageable 
future. Most of the returnees had received little to no support and none in the 
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long-term to ‘prepare’ them for re-integration. Considering a large number of 
the participants are unemployed and unable to fit in their communities, it is 
clear that sustainable returns have not been ensured, and neither are the role of 
returnees as agents of change and development enabled.  
Born in exile: protracted refugees from third countries 
Many of those returned had actually migrated to Europe after years of living in 
Iran or even being born there. Of the 25 research participants, eight (32 
percent) had been living in Iran before their decision to flee to Europe.  Since 
a major section of the research respondents had initially travelled to Europe 
after having lived in Iran for years, it is important to discuss how this affects 
their reintegration prospects in Afghanistan and the consequences of the 
return and readmission policies such as the JWF on these individuals. Basically, 
since JWF puts the burden of proof about citizenship on the returnee and the 
readmission state and the European states are only able to remove these 
citizens directly to Afghanistan, what this means for the returnee also hints at 
the inefficiency and impractically of the policy.  
Many of those with such a status stated that before migration he had not 
seen a future for themselves or for their children in Iran and complained about 
lack of educational and employment opportunities, and mistreatment of, 
discrimination and dire human rights violation of Afghan refugees in Iran. For 
example, a research respondent expresses disdain about the situation in 
Afghanistan including the security challenges and human rights violation and 
also how Afghanistan was not the right place for him to be forced to return to. 
He clarifies: 
I know Afghanistan is my country. After 30 years I was returning and was 
horrified seeing the city in such condition. I stayed for a month in Kabul and 
everything was strange. I did not feel like I belonged here at all. Despite knowing 
that Afghanistan is a toy for a handful of powerful individuals in the government 
and that if you complain, you will get your answer with a bullet, I had no choice 
but to bring my family back to Afghanistan. I had no chance in Iran anymore 
since I had sold everything. Besides, I brought my daughters back so at least their 
spirit is not crushed with insults and abuse at schools like in Iran where they 
consider Afghans as barely as valuable as animals [had been 15 days since the 
respondent’s return to Afghanistan from Iran by the time of the interview on 07 
July 2018] (male, Austria, 2015, 2016).   
Even though the above respondent had finally returned back to 
Afghanistan after having been displaced once again when he was returned by 
the EU member state to Afghanistan where he had no home, there are many 
other who had stayed uprooted for one more time due to the return to the 
wrong place. Two of the eight respondents who had initially travelled from 
Iran are still living in Afghanistan, separated from family still living in Iran and 
without a ‘home’ to return to. Considering it is a third of the research 
respondents with such a condition, it is important that the practicality of the 
policy and how this fact questions voluntariness and the returnee’s agency even 
further should be reviewed again. This should be looked at also from the 
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sustainability of return and returnee as ‘agents of change and development’ 
aspect.  
4.7 Conclusions: voluntariness and assistance of return 
The findings of this research show multiple factors that can demonstrate that 
the returns to Afghanistan under the AVR and AVRR programs such as 
related to the JWF agreement have not been entirely voluntary. These factors 
include limiting the legal right to stay (rejection of asylum), the 
unfair/inefficient asylum process (waiting period and uncertainty associated 
with the process, the living conditions, access to basic services, employment or 
educational opportunities in the country of asylum) and use of force in 
returning rejected asylum seekers (with the characteristics of deportation). All 
these points are analysed in light of the AVR/R programmes and agreements 
between the Afghan government and the EU (such as JWF) or with other 
European states.  Even though at least a third of the respondents claimed that 
they had voluntarily agreed to return, in this paper their narrative and 
understanding of what they consider voluntary or involuntary return is studied 
in detail. In the next section of this paper, the role of the Afghan government 
will be discussed further and how the entire agreement has been in the 
interests of the few powerful at the top of the government in Afghanistan, a 
discussion of social inequality along with the rights of ethnic minorities could 
prove to be useful. 
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5 A deal between devils?  
5.1 Introduction   
A recurring theme in the research findings is what returnees consider to be the 
main reason for their return or deportation. What is interesting is that they 
almost entirely blame this on the government of Afghanistan, rather than on 
European governments who initiated policies of (forced) return. In line with 
the increase in the number of Afghans fleeing towards Europe in 2015 and 
2016, the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani expressed the view in a BBC 
interview that he had no sympathy for those fleeing ‘under the slightest 
pressure’ even though he agreed Afghanistan was at war (Hakim 2016). He 
argued that when citizens leave, they ‘break the social contract’ and should 
instead ‘make a commitment’ to the country. As he put it: “countries do not 
survive by the best attempting to flee” (Hakim 2016).15 This narrative created 
by the president has dominated the discussion of returnees about why they had 
to be returned. They thought they were “sold out” by their own president, 
keeping in mind the worsening security situation and the limited to non-
existent access to basic services and rights for most Afghanis (AHRDO 2019).  
5.2 Blame, lies and responsibilities  
Even though the government’s narrative about asylum seekers is to stay ‘home’ 
so they can work for the development of their country, the situation of poverty 
and economic recession is hardly likely to be much improved by forced returns 
back to the country of ‘failed asylum seekers’. Most returnees express 
grievances against the Afghan government’s insensitive position and considers 
their own home government to be the main reason for their forced return. For 
example, one of the interviewees expresses it this way:  
Another point was that the Afghan government and European states had agreed 
on a cooperation agreement that the Afghan asylum seekers will be returned to 
Afghanistan in return for money. I do not agree with such a system, it resulted in 
our cases not being reviewed in a humane and just way and the Government 
played with our future. Rejected asylum seeker returned from Norway (male, 
2015).  
The dominant narrative among returnees is that the Afghan government 
had sold them out for money. This narrative takes a dangerous turn since most 
of the returnees expressed their disdain of the Afghan government and almost 
entirely blamed governmental officials, including the President, for their 
deportation from European countries, rather than holding European countries 
and the EU responsible. An important narrative repeated again and again was 
how the Afghan government underestimates the needs of asylum seekers and 
fails to ensure that their rights and access to safety, livelihoods and services in 






seekers had directly been told that their return was due to a request made by 
the Afghan President. Ali explains that when he complained about the unfair 
decision on his asylum, he was responded with: 
It is your President who has requested your return based on an agreement that is 
already signed for your return to your country. We are just following the rules 
and cannot do anything about this (Ali, male, Sweden, 2015, 2017).  
The signature of the JWF has been considered to have specific 
consequences within the context of Europe and asylum applications. A main 
theme that reappeared in many of the interviews was that before asylum 
seekers, even if they had received a negative decision, could stay in the country, 
apply for their case to be reviewed again and were not forced to return. 
However, with the agreement, not only that their legal right to stay shortened 
or was completely removed but since then, their applications are not even 
reviewed properly increasing the number of negative decisions. A respondent 
describes: 
The government of Afghanistan had directly contributed to my and other 
Afghan’s deportation. When I received the first negative decision against my 
asylum request, I reapplied again and wasn’t deported so that it is reviewed again. 
However, with Ghani’s visit to Sweden and Norway, the agreement was signed 
and after that Afghans would often receive negative decisions and were deported 
back to Afghanistan. After his visit, Afghan’s cases were not even investigated 
fairly and after a few days everyone kept getting negative decisions and with the 
lies of the Government of Afghanistan, we were deported (male, Norway, 2014, 
2016).  
Overall, the findings suggest that since the signature of the JWF 
cooperation agreement, access to services and living condition of the asylum 
seekers have worsened, ensuring that staying becomes a less attractive option. 
Hamid fled to Germany due to religious persecution and describes that when 
he visited the Afghan embassy in Germany to inquire about his asylum case, 
the staff insisted that he should agree to return. Talking about the impact of 
the JWF on Afghanis asylum seekers’ conditions, Hamid explains that:  
Due to the agreement between the Afghan government, especially the President, 
and the government of Germany, we were no longer allowed to work or get an 
education during our wait period, not even for the underage. Teaching of 
German language in the camps stopped even though a few humanitarian agencies 
continued with their charity work in this area. Besides, Afghans like Syrian 
asylum seekers were treated based on the humanitarian and international 
protections laws before the agreement and could at least stay in Europe until they 
felt ready and were only forced to return when they had committed a serious 
crime. Now, they reject the request without a fair process and sentence you to 
forced return (Hamid, Germany, 2015, 2018).  
Even though the JWF did not explicitly advocate for the return of Afghan 
asylum seekers, it did play an enabling role in the European context where 
large scale removals were legitimized by the policy. For example, an Afghan 
asylum seeker who volunteered to return due to the uncertainty associated with 
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the asylum process in Austria, and was assisted with return tickets, explains 
that: 
After the President’s visit to Sweden and signature of the agreement for the 
return of asylum seekers from Europe, all relevant European policies changed, 
and collective removal of Afghan refugees started. An example of such removals 
took place in our camp…before even if a person’s asylum was rejected, he could 
appeal again and wait for even ten years but with this agreement, they were all 
removed and deported to Afghanistan (Sultan, male, Austria, 2015, 2016).  
As Kuschminder (2017) describes, policies such as the JWF by pressuring 
countries of origin to readmit their nationals, permit host countries such as EU 
member states in effect to forcefully return rejected asylum seekers and other 
unwanted nationals back to those countries of origin. Even though voluntary 
return would be preferred, such policies provide legitimacy – or at least cover – 
for what are in effect forced returns (Weinar et al. 2019: 263).  
5.3 Conclusion  
What the discussion in this Chapter has shown clearly is that not all of the 
returnees are properly informed about the policies such as the Joint Way 
Forward. Instead, they are exposed to generally available information on social 
media and news platforms such as information about the Afghan President’s 
speech in Germany. Return has long been a priority of European states, but 
their insistence on return should not have implied large-scale returns 
legitimized in 2016 by the speech of the Afghan president. This hints that 
returnees are not fully informed, and this has been discussed in the last section 
in relation to the voluntariness of returns, one of the first and central criteria of 
the UNHCR guidelines on voluntary returns.  
Overall, the EU and its member states are playing a very dangerous game 
as the already limited trust between the GoA and its citizens is further strained 
through joint implementation of the JWF and similar policies the Government 
is being pressured into signing by its EU partners. It is not the EU, which is 
blamed, but the GoA that is indeed held accountable. Considering the negative 
implications this can for security in Afghanistan (AHRDO, 2019), the return of 
Afghan refugees on an involuntary basis can have very adverse results on civil 
peace in Afghanistan, of course well away from the European sub-continent, 
and in line with policies of externalization of border controls in migration. 
However, there is a danger that in the longer-run both in Afghanistan and in 
Europe there could be negative implications for the security situation of the 
JWF, worsening the situation and simply triggering more out-migration from 
Afghanistan.  
In the long-run as when one dumps rubbish in the sea, those rejected 
come back to haunt Europe in the longer-run. To drop one’s rejected migrants 
into the yard of one’s partner countries is bound to be dangerous in the long 
run, bearing similar consequences to other ‘dumping’ exercises in the past, by 
resulting in another major outflow of Afghan refugees from within 
Afghanistan or from neighbouring countries, where they see no prospects for 
their future security. 
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 6 Concluding remarks 
Building on the theoretical frameworks about ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ 
return and ‘sustainable return,’ and ‘successful/sustainable reintegration,’ the 
research finds that AVRR to Afghanistan are neither voluntary nor assisted in 
all cases. The important theoretical angles discussed here are the importance of 
the actors and policies involved that can substantiate the factors influencing 
return as such. This includes limited the legal right to stay (rejection of asylum), 
the unfair/inefficient asylum process (waiting period and uncertainty associated 
with the process, the living conditions, access to basic services, employment or 
educational opportunities in the country of asylum) and use of force in 
returning rejected asylum seekers (with the characteristics of deportation).  
One could say that as asylum applications increased during 2015 to 2017, 
when the numbers grew immensely, were poorly managed and that indeed this 
became a policy crisis. However, this can also mean that it was during this time 
of crisis, that the deep-rooted anti-immigrant policy biases of the EU and other 
European countries were put in practice. This involved organizations such as 
the IOM becoming involved, which do not act on the same human-rights-
based approach as the UNHCR, despite being a ‘UN-agency’. This research 
should not stop here, and neither should we consider the crisis to be anywhere 
close to over. With more and more evidence building up, there is a clear and 
evident need to revise the policies that enforce returns, so that forced returns 
wilfully labelled as ‘assisted voluntary returns and reintegration’ are stopped, 
and that genuine ‘joint ways forward’ be found that take into consideration, 
and care about, life after return even if it is thousands of miles away from the 
territories of the European Union.  
All in all, besides the reasons described for why the ‘assisted voluntary 
returns’ cannot be fully considered as ‘voluntary’ and ‘assisted,’ the discussion 
about centralizing agency around returnees’ pre- and post-return transnational 
mobility facilitated by provision of legal status as a vital factor in understanding 
return, can supply this research with a strong theoretical evidence-base. 
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Appendix 1: Research questionnaire 
 
● Date of interview: 
● … 
● When did you migrate (including month and year)? 
● Could you briefly describe how you migrated? 
● What was the main reason of your migration? 
● … 
Asylum System: 
● How long did it take them to process your asylum? How do you evalu-
ate this process? Was it fair or not? 
● Why was your asylum request rejected?  
Deportation to Afghanistan 
Assisted Voluntary Return  
● When and how were you returned from Europe? 
● Who or which organization picked you up at the airport in Kabul and 
how did they treat you? 
● What type of governmental/non-governmental assistance did you re-
ceive? 
Reintegration 
● After return, did you settle in Kabul or any other city? 
● After return, what kind of threats/challenges did you face? 
● Besides security issues, what effect did your migration and deportation 
have on you and your family? 
● To what extent do you think the circumstances that forced you to mi-
grate has changed? 
Return Agreements 
● What role did the Afghan government play in your return?  
● What do you know about the bilateral and multilateral agreements on 
returns between the Afghan government and European countries?  
● Do you think accepting deportees by the Afghan government in the 
current security situation was a right thing to do or not? Why?  
● … 
Remigration? 
● Are you going to stay in Afghanistan or going to migrate to regional 
countries or any European countries once again? 
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Appendix II: A conceptual discussion of return migration 
In Neoclassical Economics, migration is generally considered an economically 
rational decision and individual’s return is often considered a failed outcome, 
since the individual will return only if he (it is usually he in this model) failed 
to maximize profits as initially calculated prior migration. In NELM, on the 
other hand, migration is usually considered to be based on imperfect infor-
mation, and temporary. Return become the logical ending for a plan set out at 
household level; an individual would normally return after having achieved the 
initial goal set, e.g. to save, send a certain amount of remittances home, or di-
versify income and spread risks in the face of market uncertainties. Contrary to 
neoclassical economists, under NELM, return can indicate a successful migra-
tion process, since successful achievement and duration of stay abroad is calcu-
lated at the level of total household rather than individual purchasing power 
and savings, involving ‘mutual interdependence’ (Stark, 1991: 26 cited in Cassa-
rino 2004: 255). As Cassarino describes it, according to the NELM theory of 
returns, “migrants go abroad for a limited period of time, until they succeed in 
providing their households with the liquidity and income they expect to earn” 
(2004: 256). De Haas et al. provide a detailed discussion of cases when return is 
cited as either success or failure (Cassarino 2004) in relation to integration in 
the community of settlement. Although this study of Moroccan migrants does 
not back NE or NELM explicitly, its premises are more in line with the NE 
approach, since De Haas et al. suggest that only if a migrant achieves the ex-
pected integration into the host community, would return be a rational choice; 
by the same token, successful integration undermines the rationale for return. 
In line with NE, while “winners” settle, “losers” return” (de Haas et al. 2014). 
Factors related to poor prospects in the country of origin, related to invest-
ments for example, are positively related to the return prospects of an individ-
ual. The length of stay and success in the host community are related to the 
ability to invest in the country of origin, so in this sense part of the NELM hy-
pothesis is also supported by this study. De Haas et al. (2014) conclude that 
competing theories play a complementary role, given the considerable hetero-
geneity of the migrants in question.  
Overall, even though both theories could describe significant reasons why 
people migrate and return, many scholars have criticized them for focusing too 
much on the economic factor only. Building on this criticism, these analytical 
frameworks are inadequate for this study, which considers forced migrants, 
those who seek asylum. As Cassarino explains, “in a neoclassical stance, return 
migration exclusively involves labour migrants who miscalculated the costs of 
migration and who did not reap the benefits of higher earnings” (2004: 255). 
Migration out of Afghanistan has been multi-causal, with the poor security sit-
uation being the main reason for mass displacement (Monsutti 2007, Monsutti, 
2008, Rodriques and Monsutti, 2017), which means such economic theories 
provide at best only partial insights into reasons for return, and ways of judging 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ of such returns.   
Another concept that could complement the NE and NELM approaches, for 
the purpose of this paper, is the structural approach. This gives greater im-
portance to social and institutional factors in countries of origin, in individual 
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experiences of migrants (Cassarino, 2004: 257). This is quite relevant since de-
cisions to migrate are not made by isolated individuals but by extended fami-
lies, so that social and family ties are involved in the entire migration and re-
turn experience, including initial decision making and support for the journey 
(Monsutti, 2006, 2007, 2008). A structural approach emphasises the environ-
ment at ‘home’ as an important factor in how successful and sustainable return 
can be, and how returns impact development and social progress in the coun-
try of origin (Cassarino, 2004: 260).  
Another approach to return migrations can be found in transnational and so-
cial network theories. Transnational theories aim to understand the strong so-
cial and economic ties that can exist between communities in origin and desti-
nation countries, based on “regular and sustained social contacts over time 
across national borders” (Portes et al. 1991: 219). This approach does not con-
sider return as the end of the migration cycle, which can continue with re-
emigration (Cassarino 2004: 262). Whilst this is a very relevant approach for 
diaspora studies, this particular transnational theory is not particularly useful in 
this study, since most of the respondents are rejected asylum seekers, many of 
whom barely had the opportunity or time to integrate in their host communi-
ties or establish any long-lasting cross-border networks that could positively 
influence their decision or preparedness to return to the country of origin. Ac-
cording to Cassarino, “return takes place once enough resources, whether fi-
nancial or informational, have been gathered and when conditions at home are 
viewed as being favourable enough” (Cassarino 2004: 264). This does not re-
late to the situation of most rejected asylum seekers and other forced returnees 
whose motivations are rarely purely economic and social. Besides transnational 
identity, the concept of transnational mobility describing the back-and-forth 
movement across borders of host countries and countries of origin can be 
considered helpful for migrants’ preparedness to return. However, such con-
siderations are unlikely to figure prominently for rejected asylum seekers who 
may fear returning due to political factors as well as socioeconomic limitations, 
and who even if they aspire to re-migrate, may have very limited opportunities 
to do so.  
Finally, social network theory is discussed in Cassarino’s critical compilation of 
theories of return. Similar to transnational theory, the social network approach 
places substantial emphasis on cross-border networks in the host communities 
as established by the returnee (Cassarino, 2004: 265) and that return is not the 
end of the migration cycle (ibid.: 268). However, return being part of the mi-
gration cycle does not hold for this research since the returnee can most prob-
ably not engage in back and forth journeys between two destinations, but nei-
ther is return the end of the cycle for returnees, who may be forced to leave 
once again. This holds better under this research because many of the return-
ees show less attachment towards their countries of origin, particularly the Af-
ghan State in this case, and not necessarily because they have more allegiances 




Appendix III: Research about displacement in Afghanistan 
Research about displacement in Afghanistan include analysis of its multi-causal 
nature and as a livelihood strategy (Monsutti, 2008) demographic security anal-
ysis (Rodriques and Monsutti, 2017), its cultural factors (Monsutti, 2007) and 
the phases and patterns of displacement, transnational networks and family ties 
(Noor, 2006; Monsutti, 2008; Muller, 2009; Khan, 2014, 2017), Afghan asylum 
seekers in the region (W. Kagan, Kagan and Pletka, 2008; W. Kagan et al., 
2012; Christensen, 2016; Khan, 2017) and in Europe (Dolan, Schuster and 
Merefield, 2016; Schuster, 2011; Dimitriadi, 2013; Donini, Scalettaris and Mon-
sutti, 2016; Stanzel, 2016), return and circular migration (Monsutti, 2006, 2007; 
Schuster and Majidi, 2013; Harpviken, 2014; Khan, 2014; van Houte, 2016; 
Majidi, 2017), non-voluntary returns (Blitz, Marzano and Sales, 2005; Schuster 
and Majidi, 2013; Majidi, 2017; AHRDO, 2019) and the implications of depor-
tations including security (Schmeidl, 2002; Schuster and Majidi, 2013; 
AHRDO, 2019). 
 
